Q: Is belief the state of mind in which a person thinks something to be the case? ¶
A: Yes, and with or without there being empirical evidence to prove that something is the case with factual certainty.
Q: Is belief similar in that as we discover more about neuroscience and the brain? ¶
A: Yes, and the inevitable conclusion will be to reject the belief hypothesis in its entirety.
Q: Is belief not present or possible? ¶
A: Yes, and it reflects the fact that contradictions were necessarily overcome using cognitive dissonance.
Q: Are beliefs sometimes divided into core beliefs and dispositional beliefs? ¶
A: Yes, For example, if asked "do you believe tigers wear pink pajamas?" a person might answer that they do not, despite the fact they may never have thought about this situation before.
Q: Is belief correct - Sometimes called the "mental sentence theory," in this conception? ¶
A: Yes, and beliefs exist as coherent entities, and the way we talk about them in everyday life is a valid basis for scientific endeavour.
Q: Is belief written into the constitutions of many Islamic nations? ¶
A: Yes, and is shared by some fundamentalist Christians.
Q: Are beliefs not easily characterized as probabilistic? ¶
A: Yes.
Q: Is belief entirely wrong and will be completely superseded by a radically different theory that will have no use for the concept of belief as we know it - Known as eliminativism? ¶
A: Yes, and this view argues that the concept of belief is like obsolete theories of times past such as the four humours theory of medicine, or the phlogiston theory of combustion.
Q: Are beliefs always part of a belief system? ¶
A: Yes, and that tenanted belief systems are difficult for the tenants to completely revise or reject.
Q: Is belief normally partial and retractable with varying degrees of certainty? ¶
A: Yes.
Q: Is belief incoherent? ¶
A: Yes, and then any attempt to find the underlying neural processes that support it will fail.
Q: Is belief expressed in sentential and propositional form we are using the sense of belief-that rather than belief-in? ¶
A: Yes.
Q: Is belief entirely wrong? ¶
A: Yes, however, treating people, animals, and even computers as if they had beliefs is often a successful strategy - The major proponents of this view, Daniel Dennett and Lynne Rudder Baker, are both eliminativists in that they hold that beliefs are not a scientifically valid concept, but they don't go as far as rejecting the concept of belief as a predictive device.
Q: Are beliefs beliefs which are reasonably and necessarily contrary to the tenet of rational choice or instrumental rationality? ¶
A: Yes.
Q: Is belief referred to when people speak of what 'we' believe when this is not simply elliptical for what 'we all' believe? ¶
A: Yes.
Q: Are beliefs difficult to change? ¶
A: Yes.
Q: Are beliefs usually codified? ¶
A: Yes.
Q: Are beliefs made from""? ¶
A: Yes, Sharjah, UAE: Bentham Science Publishers, 2016.
Q: Is belief distinct from religious practice and from religious behaviours - with some believers not practicing religion and some practitioners not believing religion? ¶
A: Yes.
Q: Is belief a definition of knowledge that gained approval during the Enlightenment, 'justified' standing in contrast to 'revealed'? ¶
A: Yes, There have been attempts to trace it back to Plato and his dialogues.
Q: Are beliefs reported? ¶
A: Yes.